Europe 2025: Strategic Autonomy and its Discontents

3 min read 

"Right now, the Chinese are very friendly with us", a senior German diplomat told a me few weeks ago over dinner. "Not that we are getting anywhere with our concerns, but they listen to everything we have to say." The statement captures perfectly the current mood in EU-China relations. One can easily imagine the serious nods and friendly smiles greeting EU diplomats who put forward their various proposals—before the Chinese side finally says No.

In China's perspective, Europe in 2025 is a continent with few strategic options. Among those left, though, there is one that China thinks is highly attractive: be good friends with us. The relaxed attitude displayed by Chinese diplomats testifies to the belief that European leaders will soon come around to seeing things the same way. As indeed they might. A robust and coherent European approach to China that was so slow to emerge is now in danger of falling apart quickly.

In 2024, EU-China relations were largely strained. Constant quarrels over allegations of overcapacity, illegal subsidies and dumping in each other's markets made for a tense atmosphere in official meetings. The EU imposed double-digit tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles after an anti-subsidy investigation. In return, Beijing raised market entry barriers for certain EU products such as brandy.

All that, of course, was before Donald Trump's return to the White House. On January 14th, one week before Trump's inauguration, China's president Xi Jinping had a phone call with António Costa, the head of the European Council. "There exists no clash of fundamental interests or geopolitical conflicts between China and the European Union", Xi stated, conveniently forgetting about Ukraine for a moment. "China has always regarded Europe as an important pole in a multipolar world, firmly supported European integration, and backed the EU's pursuit of strategic autonomy."

'Multipolar world' and 'strategic autonomy' are the keywords here. In Chinese Communist Party speech, the former means a world no longer dominated by the United States, while the latter refers to a divided West, where the EU is less firmly aligned with Washington and more open to cooperation with Beijing. For years now, Chinese leaders have pushed a reluctant Europe to be more independent from China's biggest geopolitical rival. It is easy to see why this would serve their national interest. Beijing correctly expects the EU on its own to be a much more malleable partner.

While a multipolar world is still taking shape, the moment for Europe's strategic autonomy has arrived with a bang, making Beijing very happy. Speaking right after JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference in February, China's foreign minister Wang Yi gleefully noted that after Trump's return, accusations of China attempting to change the global order have largely gone quiet. "Now we don't see much talk of that because now there is a country that is withdrawing from international treaties and organizations and I think in Europe, you can feel chills almost every day", he said with more than a whiff of 'I told you so'.

How is the EU going to respond? Three days after Trump's inauguration, Germany's soon-to-be chancellor Friedrich Merz had still sounded like he was in the mood to take on China. "China's aim to achieve a so-called reunification with Taiwan represents one of the most dangerous threats to the world and to international stability today", he declared in a language that neither Olaf Scholz nor Angela Merkel would have dared to use. "Our partners in the Indo-Pacific need a signal that our presence will not be limited to the occasional transit of a frigate (…) Therefore, I call for a permanent European naval presence in the Indo-Pacific."

Remarkably, Beijing did not feel the need to protest, knowing full well that with Donald Trump working hard to destroy the transatlantic alliance, a tougher European stance on China was highly unlikely. To the contrary, there are clear signs that some European leaders are receptive to an idea touted by Wang Yi in Munich, namely to turn 2025—the year that marks the 50th anniversary of EU-China diplomatic relations—into a new thaw in Beijing's relationship with the continent. "This is a massive victory for China", the South China Morning Post quoted a European diplomat who spoke on condition of anonymity. "It is just amazing what Trump has delivered to them, in less than a month."

It surely looks like a battered Europe is tempted to revert to its old ways of accommodating China. As Noah Barkin in his Watching China in Europe newsletter reports, the European Parliament is in the process of loosening guidelines for its members that were set up as a response to China's sanctions on some MEPs back in 2021. Spain and Italy, desperate for Chinese investment, are joining Slovakia and Hungary in opposing an EU statement that would have condemned Chinese cyberattacks across Europe. The list of gifts presented to Beijing will likely keep growing.

This, to be sure, is a mistake. What Friedrich Merz said in his speech remains true, and the military escalation that an emboldened China could seek around Taiwan would hit the EU even harder than the cudgel wielded by JD Vance in Munich. Having one fabrication plant of Taiwan's chipmaker TSMC in Dresden will do little to soften the blow. And in any case, cozying up to a country that actively supports Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine and thus undermines peace and stability in Europe hardly deserves to be called autonomy. Chinese diplomats may act friendly these days, they are certainly not Europe's friends.